Waiver of the Right to Waive Will
In McGrath v. Quinn, 218 Mass. 27, 105 N.E. 555 (1914) it was held that wHere a spouse objected to the allowance of a will, but then withdrew the objection, that such withdrawal would not result in the surviving spouse submitting to the provisions of the will, and would not prevent said spouse from later waiving the will. In the case there seems to be a suggestion, however, that it might be possible for the surviving spouse to relinquish the statutory benefits:
If the petitioner had indorsed on the will his assent to its terms, he would not thereby have relinquished his right to take his distributive share as if his wife had died intestate. [Citations omitted]. A waiver moreover is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. [Citations omitted]. And the question is one of fact.
It seems from the foregoing language that if the necessary recitations are made in the disclaimer of the right to waive the will that it might take. But the court does not make such a global proclamation.